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Adverse selection and moral hazard in health
insurance.




In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance
contract with adverse selection and moral hazard. We assume that
policyholders di⁄er by the permanent health status loss and choose
an unobservable preventive e⁄ort in order to reduce the probability of
illness which is ex-ante identical. The di⁄erence in illness￿after-e⁄ect
modi￿es policyholders￿preventive actions. By the way, they di⁄er
in probabilities of illness leading to a situation close to Rothschild
and Stiglitz ￿model. In this case, we show that the optimal contract
exhibits a deductible for the high health risk type since a higher after
e⁄ect implies a higher preventive e⁄ort and then a lower probability
of illness rather than for the low health risk type.
1 Introduction
In the context of insurance, moral hazard refers to the impact of insurance
on incentives to reduce risk through preventive action. Shavell (1979) has
shown that these actions are lower than the ￿rst best value when policy-
holders can choose complete coverage if the action is unobservable. This
resultat is consistent with the introduction of irreplaceable good in the sense
of Cook and Graham (1977). Health risk is closely related to such goods
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1since health status modi￿es the utility provided by wealth. However, by
introducing health risk, Bardey and Lesur (2005) argue that it may be the
case that underinsurance is not a necessary condition to provide the right
incentives to policyholders. With full coverage, they have an incentive to
take preventive action in order to reduce the risk of being ill. This is due
to the fact that illness permanently reduces health status (as after e⁄ects,
permanent treatment).
In this paper, we focus on the implications of the introduction of adverse
selection in this framework. We want to characterize the optimal health
insurance contract. We argue that a deductible is a necessary condition in
order to achieve separation between policyholder￿ s types. Indeed, even if pol-
icyholders have incentive to take preventive action with full coverage, the in-
troduction of di⁄erent types creates a problem of discrimination. Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) had shown that second best contrats exhibit deductible
for the risk type characterized by the lower probability. In our model, we
suppose thah insured di⁄er by the health status loss. Thus, this di⁄erence in
after e⁄ects modi￿es the policyholders￿preventive actions. By the way, they
have di⁄erent probability of illness leading to a situation close to Rothschild
and Stiglitz￿ one. In this case, we show that the optimal contract exhibits a
deductible for the high health risk type since a higher after e⁄ect implies a
higher preventive e⁄ort and then a lower probability of illness.
The ￿rst section presents the framework and the second section charac-
terizes the optimal health insurance with moral hazard. The third section
exhibits the e⁄ect of adverse selection and the fourth section concludes.
2 Framework
We considerer an economy with a large number of consumer. Their prefer-
ences are described by an additively separable utility function :
U(W;H) = u(W) + H
This function is increasing and concave in wealth. As the debate on
the sign of u12 is still open (Rey, 2003), we assume that u12 = 0. So our
assumption is very closed to Shavell (1979) and Bardey and Lesur (2005)￿ s
analysis.
However, there exists two types of policyholders denoted by i 2 fL;Hg
for low and high health risk with @hH > @hL. We assume that they have
2the same initial wealth w and health status h. They face two states of
nature : an illness state with a ￿nancial loss L and health loss @hi. We
suppose that policyholders face an malignant risk : @h > 0 which appears
with a probility p. The agent can decrease this probability taking preventive
actions e ￿ 0 with an unitary cost per unit of level e⁄ort. We assume that
p ￿ p(e) with p0(e) < 0 and p"(e) > 0. We consider a health risk non-
deterministic in the sense that : p(0) < 1 and lime!1 p(e) > 0. For the
current problem, p0(0) = ￿1 and convexity of p(e) are su¢ cient conditions
for the second-order conditions on the problem of incentive compatibility
constraint of insured. We can deduce that the preventive e⁄ort level depends
on the health loss. If policyholders choose di⁄erent preventive e⁄ort for a
same indemnity, then they di⁄er in illness probabilities. In this case, we
show that deductible is necessary to achieve discrimination.
We consider a competitive market. When insurance ￿rms cannot distin-
guish among di⁄erent risk types, they may loose money by o⁄ering the set
of full information contracts as shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). In
this context, we assume that each insurer knows the proportion of good risks
and bad risks but has no information on individual types. Our model consid-
ers that ￿rm adopts a Nash equilibrium strategy. Then, a menu of contract
at equilibrium is such that no contract makes negative expected pro￿t and
no other contract earns positive expected pro￿t. Moreover, we assume that
overinsurance is not allowed.
3 Optimal insurance contract with moral haz-
ard
With ex ante moral hazard, the level of preventive e⁄ort (ei) cannot be con-
tracted for since it is unobservable to the insurer. The optimal contract
maximizes expected utility subject to the zero pro￿t constraint of the in-
surer and the incentive compatibility constraint of the insured. A contract 1
denoted Ci is de￿ned by a set of transferts contingent on the state of nature
: a payment Ii when the the insured fall ill and ￿i is the premium by unit of




EU f(1 ￿ p(ei))[U(w ￿ ￿iIi ￿ ei) + h] + p(ei)[U(w + Ii ￿ ￿iIi ￿ L ￿ ei) + h ￿ ￿hi]g
s:t: ￿iIi ￿ p(ei)Ii ￿ 0
p0(ei)
￿
U(w + Ii ￿ ￿iIi ￿ L ￿ ei) ￿ ￿hi
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with U1 the ￿rst derivative and U11 the second derivative.
We denote e ei the optimal level e⁄ort choosen by the insured. Since inter-
ested in the optimum, we have ￿i = p(ei): After computations, the optimal
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U1(w + Ii ￿ p(ei)Ii ￿ L ￿ ei)
￿U1(w ￿ p(ei)Ii ￿ ei)
￿ (2)
For a full coverage (Ii = L), we obtain
￿EU(Ii)
@Ii































i) ￿ pU11(w ￿ p(e￿
i)L ￿ e￿
i)
p"￿hi ￿ U11(w ￿ p(e￿
i)L ￿ e￿
i)
In the neighborhood of full coverage, preventive e⁄orts are increasing with







i ) ￿ ￿
p0
p . If this inequality is veri￿ed then full coverage
is optimal (Bardey and Lesur, 2005). In such a case, their level of e⁄ort has
the following property.
Lemma 1 With moral hazard, for a contract Ci(Ii;￿i) the preventive level
e⁄ort is increasing with the severity of illness.
Proof. The objective of the policyholder is to maximise their expected util-
ity. The derivative of the incentive compatibility constraint of the insured








Assuming the existence of an interior solution implies that ￿2EU
@e2
i < 0. How-
ever, p0(e) < 0 implies that
de ei
d￿hi > 0.
This property implies that optimal e⁄ort are positively correlated with
the after e⁄ect.
Corollary 2 With moral hazard, the preventive level e⁄ort of the high health
risk type is higher than that of the low health risk type.
Proposition 3 Proof. Since ￿hH > ￿hL, from the above lemma, we know
that f eH > e eL.
The high health risk type have more incentive to internalize the bene￿t of
their preventive action because the di⁄erence of the health status in the two
states is higher than of the low risk types. Then as the probability of illness
is decreasing with the level of e⁄ort, the high health risk type becomes the
low l risk for insurers. In fact, the expexted dommage of the high health risk
type is lower than the low health risk type. Introducing adverse selection in
this context, and following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), it may be the case
that the high health risk type obtain less coverage than the low health risk
type due to the fact that discrimination is based on the ￿nancial risk.
4 Optimal insurance contract with moral haz-
ard and adverse selection
Combining advserse selection with hazard moral requires to eliminate either
the moral hazard problem alone (Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983) or adverse
selection alone (Dionne and Lasserre, 1985). Then, in a ￿rst step, we resolve
the moral hazard problem. In a second step, following Fagart and Kambia-
Chopin (2004), we verify if the moral hazard contract can be solution of a
pure adverse selection model.
The existence of separiting equilibirum in a context of adverse salection
and moral hazard depends on the Spence-Mirless condition (Chassagnon and
Chiappori , 1997 ; De Meza and Webb, 2001).
5Lemma 4 For a contract Ci(Ii;￿i), a su¢ cient condition in ordre to ver-
ify the single crossing condition is that policyholder￿ s preferences are non
increasing.
Proof. We have to prove that the absolute value of the slope of the low-risk
indi⁄erence curve is lower than that of the high-risk indi⁄erence curve. For
a contract Ci(Ii;￿i), this slope is equal to
p(ei)
1 ￿ p(ei)
U1(w ￿ ￿iIi ￿ ei)
U1(w + Ii ￿ ￿iIi ￿ L ￿ ei)








U1(w+Ii￿￿iIi￿L￿eL) a su¢ cient condition is that
U1(w￿￿iIi￿ei)
U1(w+Ii￿￿iIi￿L￿ei) is decreasing
with respect to ei.
The derivative with respect to ei of this expression is negative i⁄
￿
U11(w ￿ ￿iIi ￿ ei)
U1(w ￿ ￿iIi ￿ ei)
￿ ￿
U11(w + Ii ￿ ￿iIi ￿ L ￿ ei)
U1(w + Ii ￿ ￿iIi ￿ L ￿ ei)
For Ii ￿ L this condition is veri￿ed if policyholder￿ s preferences exhibit non-
increasing absolute risk aversion.
As we shown in the previous section, the unobservable level of preven-
tive e⁄ort depends on the health risk type, then the two asymmetries can
be combined in an adverse selection problem. The optimal contract max-
imizes expected utility subject to the zero pro￿t constraint of the insurer,
the incentive compatibility constraints and the low health risk self-selection
constrainst. The optimal contract is solution of following program :
max
Ii;￿i;ei
f(1 ￿ p(ei))[U(w ￿ ￿iIi ￿ ei) + h)] + p(ei)[U(w + Ii ￿ ￿iIi ￿ L ￿ ei) + h ￿ ￿hi]g
s:t: ￿iIi ￿ p(ei)Ii = 0
8i (1 ￿ p(e￿
i))[U(w ￿ ￿iIi ￿ e￿
i) + h] + p(e￿
i)[U(w + Ii ￿ ￿iIi ￿ L ￿ e￿
i) + h ￿ ￿hi] ￿




f(1 ￿ p(z))[U(w ￿ ￿iIi ￿ z) + h] + p(z)[U(w + Ii ￿ ￿iIi ￿ L ￿ z) + h ￿ ￿hi]g
e eiargmax
x
f(1 ￿ p(x))[U(w ￿ ￿jIj ￿ x) + h] + p(x)[U(w + Ij ￿ ￿jIj ￿ L ￿ x) + h ￿ ￿hi]g
with j 6= i and i and j 2 fL;Hg
(3)
6We denote e￿
i the optimal level e⁄ort choosen by the insured when they
take their own contract and e ei the optimal level e⁄ort when the policyholder
take other contract. Under the incentive compatibility constraint, we know
that ￿i = p(ei):
However as a pure adverse selection problem, the type of equilibrium
depends on the self-selection constraint. The two self-selection constraints
can not be simultaneously binding with the moral hazard contract.
Lemma 5 The self-selection constraint of the low health risk type is binding
alone.
Proof. The proposition 2 implies that for the hazard moral contracts the
premium of the high health risk type contract is lower than that of the the low
health risk type. So, both types will select the high health risk type. Each
insurer will make losses since the average cost is greater than the premium
of the high health risk type.
With the hazard moral contracts o⁄ering a full coverage, the self-selection
constraint can be rewritten









U(w ￿ ￿iL ￿ z) ￿ p(z)￿hi
with e eiargmax
x
U(w ￿ ￿jL ￿ x) ￿ p(x)￿hi
with j 6= i and i and j 2 fL;Hg:
Firstly, with moral hazard contracts, the low health risk type never chooses
the high health risk type contract. It is due to the fact that e￿
L is an argmax
and ￿L < ￿H. e￿
L argmax implies that U(w￿￿LL￿e￿
L)￿p(e￿
L)￿hL > U(w￿
￿LL ￿ e eL) ￿ p( e eL)￿hL. ￿L < ￿H implies that U(w ￿ ￿LL ￿ e eL) ￿ p( e eL)￿hL >
U(w￿￿HL￿ e eL)￿p( e eL)￿hL. We can deduce that U(w￿￿LL￿e￿
L)￿p(e￿
L)￿hL >
U(w ￿ ￿HL ￿ e eL) ￿ p( e eL)￿hL. So, the self-selection constraint of the high
health risk type is never binding.
Secondly, with moral hazard contracts, the high health risk type prefers the
low health risk type contract. It is easy to show that U(w ￿ ￿HL ￿ e￿
H) ￿
p(e￿
H)￿hH > U(w ￿ ￿HL ￿ e￿
H) ￿ p(f eH)￿hH can be false. Fully derivativing




U11(w ￿ ￿L ￿ eH)L
U11(w ￿ ￿L ￿ eH) ￿ p"(eH)￿hH
< 0
7Assuming ￿L < ￿H implies that f eH > e￿
H. Assuming the dammage is suf-
￿ciently high,ie the reduction of premium is higher than the increasing of
cost of e⁄ort, we can deduce that ￿HL + e￿
H > ￿LL + f eH. So we have
U(w ￿ ￿HL ￿ e￿
H) < U(w ￿ ￿HL ￿ e￿
H) and p(e￿
H)￿hH > p(f eH)￿hH. With
moral hazard contracts, we can conlude that the self-selection constraint of
the low health risk is never true. Then, at equilibrium, this self-selection
constraint is binding.
At equilibrium, the low health risk receive full insurance since the low-
risk self-selection constraint is not binding. The solution of our programm
implies that the high health tsik type receives less than full insurance. We can
summarize the description of the separati,g equilibrium with the following
proposition
Proposition 6 In the presence of adverse selection and hazard moral, an
optimal set of separating contract has the following characteristics
a) The low health risk type receives full coverage
b) The high health risk type receives partial coverage
Using lemma 4 the equilibrium separting is due to the fact that the single
crossing is veri￿ed. Lemma 5 implies that full insurance can not be o⁄ered
to the high health risk type and low health risk type obtains full coverage.
Only the low health risk type obtains the moral hazard contract whereas
the high health risk type are restricted to partial insurance. This result seems
to be in opposition to the Rothschild and Stiglitz￿s analysis. They focus only
on the ￿nancial risk. In our model, the high health risk type become the low
￿nancial risk type because the insurable health loss lead them to make most
preventive e⁄ort.
5 Conclusion
We consider a model of health insurance. The health dimension is taken into
account by considering a bivariated utility function. We assume that poli-
cyholders face not only a ￿nancial risk due to the cost of the treatment but
also a risk on their health status since they su⁄er from a permanent health
status loss in case of illness. Moreover we consider that there are di⁄erent
permanent health status loss i.e. di⁄erent health risk type. They also may
undertake an unobservable preventive e⁄ort in order to reduce the proba-
bility of illness. The di⁄erence in illness￿after-e⁄ect modi￿es policyholders￿
8preventive actions. By the way, they di⁄er in probabilities of illness leading
to a situation close to Rothschild and Stiglitz ￿model. In this case, we show
that the optimal contract exhibits a deductible for the high health risk type
since a higher after e⁄ect implies a higher preventive e⁄ort and then a lower
probability of illness rather than for the low health risk type. Then high
health risk are the low risk in term of expected loss and recieve undercover-
age in case discrimination is allowed. They are not only the less wealthy in
case of illness but also the less covered. This result gives a new argument to
forbid discrimination in health insurance market.
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